With the coronavirus infection spreading up, prices are growing for certain categories of goods including food products, medical masks and disinfectants. In order to limit the unjustified growth of prices for goods of social importance, state authorities are taking additional measures, mostly connected with price monitoring.

In the difficult epidemiological situation caused by the spread of the new coronavirus infection, state authorities are taking actions to amend Federal Law No. 44-FZ dated 5 April 2013 “On the contract system in the area of the purchases of goods, work and services to provide for the state and municipal needs”.

By incorporating a non-competition clause into an agreement, the parties to it usually seek to prevent any of them from enjoying an advantage. However, this tool may be used unfairly, for example, with a view to forming a cartel. In the Russian Federation, the legislative regulation of non-competition clauses still lacks clarity.

Pepeliaev Group advises of the changes in the area of antimonopoly compliance.

The antimonopoly service (the “FAS”) has launched a counter-offensive, in terms of both law and methodology, against anticompetitive agreements which are increasingly permeating the state’s strategic and vital spheres, causing enormous damage to the country’s economy.

The conclusions of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia relating to the Google case have prompted members of parliament to come forward with an initiative to introduce state regulation of the market of pre-installed applications. However, such an artificial restriction of competition may adversely affect the quality of products and entail an increase in their prices for consumers.

The FAS of Russia has put before the State Duma a draft law on antitrust compliance. It contains amendments to Federal Law “On the protection of competition”, and the draft itself has the nature of a framework. Once they are finally adopted the new rules will most likely require specification at the level of subordinate legislation adopted by the regulator.

Thirteen years ago the institution of collective dominance was introduced in Russia. Today, collective dominance is applied more widely in Russia than in the EU. Ironically, in the U.S.A., the homeland of antitrust regulation, there is no such tool at all. An examination of Russian practice casts doubt on the model of how this institution is applied.

The global nature of business processes and the potential threat of anti-competitive practices of foreign entities on EAEU markets is driving the need to expand the EEC’s powers. It appears advisable to confer the right on the Commission to investigate antitrust cases involving companies registered outside the Union.

Cases are being encountered ever more frequently when anticompetitive agreements during bidding processes are entered into and implemented using auction robots. The regulator in turn is learning to identify digital traces of anticompetitive conduct, to document them and to prove robotic collusions. Examples of the successful fight against this are already available.